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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 16873 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of Duffy 
Palmer sitting as the District Court Judge in Morgan 
County wherein a judgment was granted against the 
defendants on the 20th day of November, 1979. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the plaintiff's a judgment 
on their complaint declaring the road in question to be 
a public road and that the plaintiffs had a 
right-of-way by easement over said road. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the Court reverse the 
decision of the District Court and declare that the 
road in question is a private road. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants own property located in Cottonwood 
Canyon in Morgan County, State of Utah. There is a dirt 
road which traverses the Cottonwood Canyon and services 
the various property owners in that canyon. A road has 
existed in the canyon since before 1925. Prior to 1929, 
there were at least three gates located on the road as 
it proceeded up the canyon. (T.114) In approximately 
1929, the road was modified and straightened and has 
remained in that condition to the present time. The 
road in question crosses the Cottonwood Creek. In about 
1929, the State of Utah gave the property owners a 
bridge that had been previously used on U.S. Highway 
305 That bridge was used to span the creek and is now 
part of the road which is the subject matter of this 
lawsuit. (T.115 and T.116) The appellants own all of 
the property in the canyon including the property over 
which the road passes with the exception of approxi-
mately two sections of land which were purchased by the 
United States Forest Service in 1965. (T.159, 160 & 
167, lines~ through 7) The Forest Service property is 
-2-
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approximately nine miles up the canyon. The Forest 
Service does not have a legal right-of-way across the 
property belonging to the appellants. However, the 
appellants allow the Forest Service personnel, as well 
as all other persons owning property in Cottonwood 
Canyon to use the road for access to their property. 
(T.25, lines 13 through 22) 
In 1978, the property owners, the appellants 
herein caused a gate to be installed at the mouth of 
the canyon in order to limit the access to the road and 
the property located in the canyon. There is an addi-
tional section of the road which has been paved in the 
vicinity of the Browning Arms Industry. This section of 
the road is also privately owned by the appellants. 
However, the appellants, over the years, have allowed 
this road to be paved and to be used by the public. The 
gate that was installed did not, in any way, restrict 
access to the paved portion of the road and the paved 
portion of the road is not part of the subject matter 
of this lawsuit. (T.124, lin~ 29 through T.25 line 21) 
Shortly after the gate was installed on the dirt por-
tion of the road which the appellants claim is a pri-
vate road, this lawsuit was instigated by the appel-
lants for the purpose of having the Court grant them an 
-3-
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easement over the road and/or to declare the road 
from the gate up Cottonwood Canyon to be a public road. 
At the time the road in question was put in its 
present condition, which was in approximately 1929, the 
property owners caused no trespassing signs to be 
placed along the road and upon their private property 
which adjoins the road. Exhibits 1 and 2 show part of 
the road and a sign which is located beside the road 
notifying people that they are not to trespass. The 
sign in question is approximately four-foot by 
four-foot and has been in existence continually since 
1947 or 19500 (T.203) The sign was relocated-in about 
1965 so that it was moved closer to the location of the 
present gate. (T.122, line 15 through T.123, line 9) 
The sign which is shown in Exhibits 1 and 2 reads 
as follows: "No trespassing on private property in this 
canyon. Law says no shooting, only in hunting seasons. 
It is up to you to know the law and where you are-. 
Violators will be prosecuted". 
In addition to the sign which is shown in Exhibits 
1 and 2, other signs indicating no trespassing have 
always existed along the road since 1947. (T.203, lines 
1 through 25}- The appellants have also attempted to 
notify people by causing various objects along the road 
to be painted with an orange paint. The bridge in 
-4-
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question, as well as rocks and fenceposts along the 
road, have been painted orange ever since the Utah 
Wildlife Resources issued a proclamation stating that 
orange paint indicated private property. This proclam-
ation was first issued in approximately 1973. (T.187, 
line 25 through T.189, line 9) 
Each year one of the property owners fences off 
the road in question in the vicinity of the bridge for 
the purpose of using the roadway to handle his sheep. 
This occurs about three times a year and amounts to a 
total period of about two weeks. During this period 
of time no traffic is allowed through the fenced area. 
T.209, line 28 through T.211, line 4) 
The parties owning property in the canyon have 
attempted over the years to limit the access of people 
along the Cottonwood Road. For a long period of time 
the road was only used by property owners and people 
who had business in the canyon. However, this began to 
change as vehicles were developed which allowed people 
to get into more rugged terrain. Consequently, for 
the past twelve to fifteen years the property owners 
have had to exert more effort to limit the people that 
were attempting to use the road. (T.120 and 142) The 
problem became severe enough that in 1964 the Byram 
family, appellants herein, caused a notice to be pub-
lished in the Ogden Standard Examiner which has general 
-5-
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circulation throughout Morgan County. That notice read 
as follows: 
Notice, all hunters! Due to the 
disrespect of three hunters 
Sunday for private property 
and their refusal to comply 
with the request of our employees 
we are forced to close perma-
nently all lands in Davis, 
Morgan and Weber, Cache and 
Rich Counties to any and all 
forms of use by the public as 
of this date. Robert Byram 
Sense (Exhibit 3) 
At about this same time many of the property owners in 
Cottonwood Canyon began to require written p~rmits for 
people to travel in the Cottonwood Canyon and to hunt 
on their private lands. Prior to this time people had 
been required to obtain verbal permission and on 
occasion the property owners would permit their 
neighbors and friends to use the road and property in 
the canyon even though they did not obtain specific 
permission. (T.176, lines 14 through 16) 
The property located in the Cottonwood Canyon 
covers an extensive area and the road in question is 
approximately ten miles long. Consequently, the owners 
were not able to continuously patrol the road or their 
propertya (T.128 and 184) 
The respondents and the witnesses testifying on 
behalf of the respondents stated that they had used the 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
road for hunting over the years and during that period 
of time had observed the signs along the road indicat-
ing that the property was private and indicating no 
trespassing. Inspite of these signs, these individuals 
used the road and property in the canyon without obtain-
ing permission. (T.57, 58 and 73) These individuals did 
not know who owned the property on which the road was 
located .. (TQ42 and 81) Many of them admitted that they 
had intentionally and knowingly trespassed upon the 
property of the appellants. A few of the respondents 
claimed that for a period of twenty years they had been 
travelling the road for the purpose of getting· to the 
Forest Service land and that they had hunted and camped 
on the Forest land not, on private property.· ( T. 64 and 
178) However, the evidence was clear that the Forest 
land had only been acquired in 1965 and consequently, 
the respondents could not have been hunting and camping 
on Forest land. (T.159, 160 and 167) 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WERE CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND IN MANY CASES T.OTALLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY ANY TESTIMONY WHATSOEVER. 
-7-
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This matter was tried before the Honorable J. 
Duffy Palmer on September 11, 1979. Judge Palmer took 
the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum 
Decision on the 17th day of October, 1979. That 
Memorandum Decision was eight pages long and proported 
to outline the testimony given by each one of the wit-
nesses called at the trial. A review of the Memorandum 
Decision will demonstrate that Judge Palmer did not 
give a fair and impartial hearing to all of the 
evidence presented. A casual observation of the Memo-
randum Decision will demonstrate that Judge Palmer has 
attempted to phrase the testimony of the various wit- .. 
nesses in a manner that will support the Judge's ulti-
mate conclusion. The Memorandum is one that you might 
expect to be presented by an advocate rather than one 
prepared by a Judge who is charged by law to be fair 
and impartial. The summary of the testimony given by 
the witnesses is inaccurate and in some cases even 
diametrically opposed to the actual testimony which was 
given at the trial. 
One of the best examples of this concerns the 
testimony of a Clem Morris, one of the witnesses called 
by the respondents. One page 3 of the Memorandum 
Decision, Judge Palmer finds that Mr. Morris knew about 
the road in_question for 58 years and that from 1920 on 
-8-
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Mr. Morris knew it was a public road and felt that from 
that time to the present the road had always been and 
used extensively by the publicc In fact, Mr. Morris 
did not make any such statements. Mr& Morris testified 
that he was not familiar with the Cottonwood Canyon 
Road at the present time but had been familiar with it 
in the 1920's for a period of 8 years. (T.65, line 20 
through T.66, line 20) He testified that he owned 
land in the vicinity of the road and that the road was 
in a somewhat different position at the time he lived 
there than.it was at the time of the trial. (T.66, line 
29 through T.68, line 1) He was asked by the 
respondents' attorney if he had ever had an occasion to 
be in the Cottonwood Canyon since the time he lived 
there. His response was "No". (T. 66, lines 18 through 
20) Mr. Morris did testify thai he felt the road was 
open during the time he lived there; however, he did 
not give any testimony about the road being used exten-
sively by the public. It is evident from comparing the 
Judge's Memorandum with the actual testimony that the 
conclusions of the Judge must have been a figment of 
his imag~nation since they are not supported by the 
testimony of ·Mr. Morris. 
The respondents called a Clinton Gruel, an 
employee of-the United States Forest Service, as a 
-9-
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witness. Judge Palmer found Mr. Gruel testified that 
the federal goverment paid Morgan County for law 
enforcement "of the roadway". This again was totally 
unsubstantiated by the evidence. Mr. Gruel testified 
that money was given to Morgan County because Forest 
Service land was located within the County. He speci-
fically testified that the money was not for the pur-
pose of patrolling the private road leading to the. 
forest land. He indicated that the money could not be 
expended for use on private land. (P.28, lines 15 
through 29) Mr. Gruel also testified that the forest 
service did not have any legal rights to the road and 
used it only by permission of the property owners and 
that when anyone called and inquired of his office 
concerning the use of the road, they were informed that 
it was a private road. (T.25, line 18 through T. 26, 
line 5) 
Judge Palmer found that the former sheriff, Porter 
Carter, who had patrolled the road for 16 years 
believed the road was open to the public and in fact a 
public road. Porter Carter in fact testified that he 
patrolled the road to keep people from stealing and 
destroying private property and that he did not know 
that the road was private property. He further testi-
fied that when he ref erred to the public using the road 
-10-
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he did not distinguish between private property owners 
and other people who did n?t own property in the 
canyon. (T.42, lines 3 through 27) 
Judge Palmer found that a Delbert Kester, a rela-
tive of one of the respondentst testified that he had 
used the road since 1937 and that it was always open 
and that he was never required- to get a permit from 
anyone and did not observe any restrictions on the use 
of the road. In fact, Mr. Kester testified that he had 
known about the no trespass signs, Exhibits 1 and 2, 
for many years and that he knew the private land was 
posted but still hunted on that land. (T.58, lines 2 
through 30) At one time Mr. Kester had lived on private 
property that was located in the vicinity of the road 
and consequently, was allowed to use the property. 
(T.59, lines 11 through T.60 line 6) He also testified 
that he did not know if the people travelling on the 
road were doing so pursuant to permission and that he 
did not worry about that fact. (T.60 lines 7 through 
15) Mr. Kester and his son had purchased permits from 
the Byrams for a period of 2 years and were aware that 
the Byrams required individuals to have permits to go 
on the property because the permits were sold at Mr. 
Kester's place of business, a cafe known as Trout 
Springs Cafe, which Mr. Kester owned between 1952 and 
-11-
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1955. (T.54, lines 19 through 22, T.56, lines 3 through 
6, T.63, lines 19 through 26) Even though Mr. Kester 
claims to have been acqua~nted with the property since 
1937, he testified that he was not acquainted with the 
Byrams and had never spoken with Mr. Wilkinson con-
cerning the use of the property in the Cottonwood 
Canyon. (T.55, lines 19 through 30) He also claimed to 
have camped on federal land for 20' years when in fact 
the property had only belonged to the forest service 
for approximately 14 years. (T.63, line 27 through 
T.64, line 13) 
Judge Palmer found that Basil Thurman had been 
using the property for 29 years without any restric-
tions or limitations on the use of the road and that he 
had seen other people and vehicles using the road. In 
fact, Mr. Thurman testified that in over 29 years of 
using the road and property that he had never seen any 
of the owners of the property in the canyon and had 
never talked to anyone except Cecil Byram and that was 
by telephone concerning why Mr. Byram had closed his 
property. (T.80, line 22 through T.81, line 10) He also 
testified that he had been hunting on federal property 
for 29 years when in fact the land had only been owned 
by the federal government for 14 years. (T.78, line 13 
through T. 79, line 11) Mr. Thurman admitted under oath 
-12-
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that he had known that permits were required to go on 
the property since 1959 and had known about the no 
trespassing sign for 29 years. (T.79, lines 21 throu~h 
26, T.73, lines 10 through 25) 
Judge Palmer found that Joseph Page, one of the 
appellants' witnesses, used the road for 11 years 
and was never restricted or stopped while using the 
road. Joseph Page testified that during the time he 
used the road the did not know any of the property 
owners with the exception of Val Byram, and that he had 
never spoken to any of them concerning the use of 
the road. (T.85, lines 15 through 20) Mr. Page observed 
the signs in the area for as long as he had been going 
up the road, but he had never at any time inquired to 
find out if the road was private or who owned the 
property. (T.86, line 3 through T.88, line 1) 
The seventh witness called for the respondents was 
Ronald Kester. The Court found that he had been using 
the property for 28 years and that there had never been 
any limitation on the use of the road. However, Mr. 
Kester testified that he had also known about the signs 
the along the road including Exhibits 1 and 2 and had 
not checked to see if the road was private. (T.96, 
line 27 through T.97, line 16) He also testified thathe 
had not been on the property since the Byrams began 
-13-
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selling permits in approximately 1965 except by permis-
sion from Mr. Richins. (T.94, lines 7 through 25) 
Judge Palmer found that Vaughn Kester and Elton 
LaVar Wood had used the road over a period of time and 
had never been restricted in their use. These wit-
nesses, however, testified that they had known about 
the signs along the road and had used the property 
inspite of the signs. Mr. Kester testified that his 
attitude was that he would do what he wanted to on the 
land unless someone physically kicked him off. (T.103, 
line 29 through T.104, line 4) Mr. Wood testified that 
he was a personal friend of Mr. Wilkinson and that he 
had Mr. Wilkinson's permission to use the property in 
the canyon. (T.107, lines 5 through 30) 
As can be seen from the comparisons between Judge 
Palmer's findings and the actual testimony given at the 
trial, Judge Palmer made many findings that were not 
supported by the evidence and in fact were directly 
contrary to the evidence presented at the time of the 
trial. Judge Palmer, at the end of the trial, took time 
to compliment Mr. Harry Wilkinson on his testimony. He 
indicated that he thought Mr. Wilkinson was very honest 
and candid in his testimony and that it was refreshing 
to see that type of testimony presented before the 
Court. (T.2il) However, the Judge did not accept Mr. 
-14-
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Wilkinson's testimony, and in fact, found that Mr. 
Wilkinson said many things to which he did not testify. 
The Judge claims that Mr. Wilkinson said that the 
road in question was at one time a state road. He also 
attributes to Mrc Wilkinson a statement to the effect 
that the road had been open and that there had been no 
restrictions on the road for the last 10 to 12 years. 
In fact, Mr. Wilkinson was very emphatic in testifying 
to the contrary. Mr. Wilkinson did not at any time 
indicate in his testimony that the road had ever been 
owned by the state. He did indicate that a bridge had 
been removed from state highway #30 and given to the 
property owners to be installed across the Cottonwood 
Creek in the Cottonwood Canyon. (T.116) He also testi-
fied that the county did use some of their equipment to 
grade their road on occasion. However, Mr. Wilkinson 
pointed out that the county equipment was used in many 
occasions for private purposes when requested by county 
citizens even including the plowing of the peach 
orchards. This practice was stopped during the time 
when Mr. Wilkinson was chairman of the Morgan County 
Commission. (T.116 through T.118) Mr. Wilkinson 
testified that there was never a time when the property 
owners consented that the public could have free and 
unlimited access to the road and the property in the 
-15-
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canyon. He testified that they had done everything 
within their power to restrict the road even though 
they had allowed the use by friends and neighbors and 
peopie that they knew and could trust. (T.128 lines 11 
through 30, T.142, lines 1 through 30) Apparently, the 
testimony of Mro Wilkinson relied upon by the Judge to 
reach his conclusion that the road had been open was 
the testimony given by Mr. Wilkinson ,on Page 119. That 
testimony was as follows: 
Q Give us a little history on 
your recollection of the use of 
that road, whether it's been open 
ever generally to the public or 
whether it's been by permission. 
A Well, it hasn't been what 
I should say restricted because 
most, like Mr. Wood, he's a 
friend, or some boy scouts or 
somebody that wanted to go camping. 
We haven't restricted it to that. 
Until recently it's been fairly 
well open. There's no question 
about that. But, only because we 
knew who was going and we weren't 
going to get any damage. 
Q Was this pretty much by your 
permission then and consent? 
A Yes, mostly, generally do. 
Q All right, do I understand 
then for a period of time the 
people that would use it were 
people that you would be personally 
acquainted up until a certain 
period of time. 
A Yes, until the automobile 
started to come, you know, and 
stuff like that, there was no 
question about it. (T.119, lines 15 through 30) 
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It is very important to view this testimony in light of 
the overall testimony of Mr. Wilkinson and not to pull 
it out of context. The other testimony of Mr. Wilkinson 
made it clear that he allowed friends and neighbors and 
people known to him to use the road but did not other-
wise feel that the road had been opened to the public. 
Mr. Wilkinson testified specifically that the property 
owners tried to limit the traffic on the road to people 
who had written or verbal permission. (T.126, lines 17 
through 30) On at least one occasion approximately 14 
to 15 years ago Mr. Wilkinson had Sheriff Porter Carter 
remove an individual from the private road because he 
was doing damage to it. (T.129 lines 18 through 28) 
He also testified that he had requested Sheriff Max 
Robinson to remove individuals that were on the private 
road. (T.135, lines 2 through 12) Mr. Wilkinson pointed 
out that there were six property owners along the road 
who had the right to give permission for use of the 
road. Consequently, it was not possible for him to 
always know which people had permission to use the road 
and which people were using the road without permis-
sion. (T.143, line 18 through T.144, line 3) 
Judge Palmer acknowledged that three of the 
defense witnesses, Dee Hancock, Kenneth Hancock, the 
Weber County Fire Chief, and Al Conklin, all testified 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that they had used the road from between 20 and thirty 
years and had always felt that it was private property 
and road and obtained permission before going on the 
property. In fact, these witnesses did so testify and 
testified that they felt that the road was private and 
that they should not use it unless they had permission 
from the owners~ (T.148, 162 and 215) T~ese witnesses 
also testified that they were aware of the signs along 
the road and felt that the signs indicated that the 
road was private. (T.141, 154, 164) All of these 
witnesses indicated that they had not seen anything to 
indicate to them.that the road was an open or a public 
road. (T.148, 154, 162) 
One of the witnesses for the defense, Frank 
Bowman, is no longer a property owner in Cottonwood 
Canyon. He was the individual that sold his land to the 
Forest Service in approximately 1965. Mr. Bowman had 
been very involved in the county affairs, served on the 
county commission and has been on the county planning 
commission since 1963. (T.166, lines 4 through 12) Mr. 
Bowman testified that Morgan County has not accepted 
the Cottonwood Canyon as a public road and has not 
received any .PMC road money for that road. (T.169, 
lines 25 through 30) 
-18-
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Judge Palmer did not give much emphasis to the 
testimony of the other appellants in this case. Val 
Byram testified that he had caused an article to be pub-
lished in the Standard Examiner in 1964 notifying 
people that the Byrams property was private. A copy 
of that advertisement was introduced into evidence 
as Exhibit 3. Mr. Byram also explained that written 
permits were required in order for people to come 
onto their property. A copy of one of those permits 
was entered into· evidence as Exhibit 4. Approximately 
180 permits were issued by the. Byrams alone each year 
for people to travel in the canyon upon the road. 
In addition, other individuals were allowed into the 
canyon who had permission from the other property 
owners that lived on the road. (T.180) Val Byram was 
the individual who caused the bridge, fence posts and 
other objects in the canyon to be painted orange 
thereby·notifying any parties coming into the canyon 
that the property involved was private. (T.188) Val 
Byram was very emphatic that the use of the road had 
always been by permission and that the road have never 
beeri open to the public. (T.183) 
The comments made by Judge Palmer concerning 
the testimony of Kenneth Byram are accurate. However, 
the Judge ignored or did not ref er to much of the 
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important information testified to by Kenneth Byram. 
Mr. Byram testified that the intent of the property 
owners in causing the no trespassing signs, Exhibits 1 
and 2, to be installed was to indicate that the road 
was private and closed. (T.204) This witness also 
testified that their business suffered greatly because 
of the trespass of individuals on their property. He 
noted one occasion on which one of the cows in the area 
was shot fifteen times. (T.205) Mr. Byram did request 
the Forest Service to help keep trespassers off the 
road, but the Forest Service refused to do it saying. 
that it was impossible. (T.206, lines 1 through 4) 
Leland Kippen, one of the appellants, testified 
that the no trespassing signs had been on the road 
since he became acquainted with the area in 1950 and 
that the road had never been open to the public. 
(T.214, 215) Mr. Bill Byram testified that he actual-
ly patrolled the road for the purpose of keeping tres-
passers off the road and property and had filed 
criminal actions against individuals who had used 
the road. (T.221, lines 12 through 30) This witness 
also testified that the purpose of the no trespas-
sing sign was· to close the canyon and the road. (T.222, 
lines 18 through 23) This witness had personal 
knowledge or the fact that the road was closed off each 
year to keep the traffic off the road and to allow the 
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property owners to use it for their sheep herding 
business. (T.224, line 25 through T.25, line 9) 
It is the position of the appellants that a Judge 
must fairly and impartially consider all of the 
evidence presented to him. The Judge issued the 
Memorandum Decision over one month after having heard 
the testimony6 This could account for the great 
variance between the Judge's findings and the actual 
testimony presented at the trial. Regardless of the 
reason for the variance, it is clear that the Judge 
committed prejudicial error in making findings which 
were not supported by the evidence. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE RESPONDENTS HAD A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OVER THE 
ROAD IN QUESTION. 
In order to establish an easement by use, the 
respondents must show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that a prescriptive easement has been estab-
lished by open, adverse, notorious and uninterrupted 
use for a period of in excess of twenty years. Cas-
sit-ty vs. Castagno, 247 P.2d 837 (Utah, 1959) It is 
the position .of the appellants that the use must be 
of such a nature that the owner is placed upon 
notice that_the respondents intend to claim a right 
that is adverse to that of the appellants. With that 
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knowledge, the appellants must acquiesce in that use 
or at least allow that use to continue uninterrupted 
for a period of twenty years. The party may not 
claim a prescriptive easement by reason of use that 
did not become known to the owners of the property. 
Such a use obviously would not comply with the 
requirements that the use be adverse and notorious. 
There have been a number of Utah cases that 
have discussed this principle. In the case of Zol-
linger vs. Frank, 110 U. 514, 175 P~2d 714, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that in order to create a pre-
scriptive right-of-way, the adverse use must be 
against the owner as distinguished from under the 
owner. The Court went on to say that this was true 
regardless of whether the use was described as being 
adverse, hostile, peaceful or with the consent of 
the owner. The Court, in Savage vs. Nielsen, 114 U. 
22, 197 P.2nd 117, stated that when a person has the 
right to use an easement by reason of the owner's 
consent, the use cannot become adverse until the 
owner has received notice of the claimant's hostile 
use of the land. The Court went on to state that a 
prescriptive title to an easement cannot be obtained 
when the use is allowed as a mere neighborly accom-
-
modation. In the case of Lunt vs. Kitchens, 123 U. 
488, 660 P.2nd 535, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
when a landowner consents to the use of his land, such 
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use is by license and a prescriptive easement cannot be 
created unless the license is renounced. ·The Court went 
on to say that the issue is ·whethe·r the use was against 
or under the owner. 
It is the position of the appellants that the 
four respondents in this matter all testified that 
they had used the road on a limited basis over the 
years for hunting and for occasional picnicing. During 
that time they testified that they had seldom, if ever, 
seen the property owners or had any contact with them. 
These same individuals admitted having seen signs 
telling them to stay off the private property but with 
that knowledge had still used the road and had used the 
property of Frank Bowman and others in the canyon 
without their permission. These parties did not even 
know who owned the land and obviously made no contact 
with the owners to notify them that they were going to 
use the property. They claimed that they were using 
forest land but the evidence is clear that the land 
they used has only been owned by the forest service 
for a period of approximately fourteen years. It is 
the position of the appellants that this cannot be an 
open, notorious and adverse use in light of the fact 
that the appellants did not even know the respondents 
were using their land. 
It should be noted that Byram and Sons, one of the 
property owners in Cottonwood Canyon issued up to 180 
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hunting permits each year. (T.180, lines 8 through 15) 
The other property owners also gave permission to 
friends, neighbors and other individuals to hunt the 
land, and a property owner would honor the permits 
given by another property owner in the canyon. Conse-
quently, there were numerous people who would use the 
land and the property with permission of the property 
owners. The respondents used the road on a limited 
basis and most of the use was during the hunting season 
when hundreds of people who had permission would be in 
the canyon. Consequently, it would be.impossible for 
the property owners to know that four individuals were 
using the property without authority. Without this 
knowledge, the property ·owners could not acquiesce 
in that use. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE ROAD IN QUESTION WAS DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO 
PUBLIC USE. 
Section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code Annotated states 
as follows: 
Public Use Constituting Dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have 
been dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public when it has been 
continuously used for a public thorough-
fare for a period of ten years. 
-24-
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Dedication is defined in Ballentine's law Diction-
ary, on page 318 as follows: 
The setting aside of land for 
public use, in other words the 
intentional appropriation or 
donation of land, or of an easement 
or interest therein by its owner 
for some proper public use. 
Counsel for the respondents, in a Memorandum submit-
ted to Judge Palmer, made the following statement 
concerning dedication: "Dedication requires the 
elements of off er or consent by the owner and an 
acceptance of this offer by the public. (26 C.J.S. 
399)" The appellants agree with this statement of 
law. 
The appellants contend that the respondents have 
the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 
evidence that the road was offered to the public by the 
property owners or the property owners consented to the 
road becoming public and that this off er was accepted 
by the public. 
In the case of Petersen vs. Combe, 20 U. 2d 
376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the burden of proving a public use continuously 
for ten (lO)·years must be demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence. That case involved a claim that a 
road known -as Combe Road in Weber County had been 
dedicated as a public street. The court stated that the 
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owners of the property abutting or strattling the road 
cannot be considered members of the public in order to 
establish the public use required by statute. The Court 
made a special point of the fact that the evidence 
established that the landowners had posted a warning 
sign on the road claiming the property to be private. 
The sign was introduced at the trial by photograph and 
none of the parties seriously contested the fact that 
the sign had been in place. There was also testimony 
presented that some parties had been aware of the no 
trespassing sign and had entered the road with the 
consent of the property owners. This case also involved 
testimony that certain public agencies such as the 
Weber Basin Water Conservatory District, the telephone 
company and the Fish and Game Department used the road 
with the permission of the property owners to service 
their own interests. In view of this evidence, the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower Court's decision 
and found that public use of the road had not been 
established. In doing so the Supreme· court stated 
that the burden must be borne by the party claiming 
public use by "clear and convincing evidence that 
constitutionally must be justified. 
." In a dis-
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The ownership of property as 
evidenced by duly recorded written 
documents should be granted a 
high degree of sanctity and respect.· 
Such ownership should neither be 
taken nor eroded away by stealth 
or inadvertence in the use or 
encroachment thereon by others. 
In order for others to acquire 
rights therein, the adverse use · 
must be done in such a way that the 
owner knows or should know the right 
to use his property is being 
asserted against him. The proof 
of these facts must be clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Judge Crockett 1 s dissenting opinion was based 
primarily on the fact that he felt that the Court 
should honor the determination· of the trial Judge 
in this regard. 
A similar decision concerning the burden of proof 
was rendered in Thomas vs. Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 493 
P.2d 639 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
occasional use by the public of unoccupied land with 
the knowledge and without objection of the owner will 
not create an inference that the owners intended to 
dedicate the land as a public road. In the case Culner 
vs. Salt Lake City, 27 U. 252, 75 P. 620, the Utah 
Supreme Court stat~d that an alleyway was not a public 
road even though it had been used by the public for a 
number of years when the property owners had always 
maintained control over the alleyway and had closed it 
from time to time. 
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In the case of Gillmor vs. Carter, 15 U.2d 280, 
391 P.2d 426 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
road was not dedicated to the public under the state 
law. In reaching that decision, the court pointed out 
that the owners of the land had installed gates and 
signs at strategic points indicating that the land was 
not open to the use of the publico The party claiming 
the road public acknowledged that he had seen said 
gates and signs. The Court also found that it was 
important that the landowners had entered into an 
agreement to allow certain duck clubs and others to use 
the road with their permission and over the years had 
instigated lawsuits in defense of their claim that 
the property was private. The Supreme Court then stated: 
Such actions by owners who have 
established a road over their own 
lands, even though a portion of 
the road traverses land not owned 
by them is inconsistent with a 
10-year use of this road as a 
public thoroughfare. 
The Court also cited a law which stated in part as 
follows: 
Use under private right is not 
sufficient. If the thoroughfare 
is laid out or use as a private 
way, its use, however, long, as a 
private·way does not make it a 
public way .. 
The Court ruled that there must be evidence of in-
tent by the owner or owners to dedicate the road to the 
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public and proof of acceptance by the public before the 
requirements.of state statutes can be met. 
In the case of Morris vs. Blunt, 49 U. 243, 161 P. 
1127, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a use of the 
road under a private right is insufficient to show a 
dedication regardless of how long it has been used and 
the fact that the public also uses the road without 
objections from the owners will not make it a public 
way. In the case of Bonner vs. Fudbury! 18 U. 2d 140, 
417 P.2d 646 (1966), the Utah Supreme Court reached a 
similar decision. The Court in that case upheld a lower 
court ruling that a dead-end road was in fact dedicated 
to the public. In its decision, however, it stated 
clearly the principle that must be applied in making 
that decision. The court stated: 
In connection with this review 
we deem it appropriate to note our 
agreement that the dedication of 
one's property to a public use 
should not be regarded lightly 
and that certain principles should 
be adhered to. The presumption is 
in favor of the property owner; · 
and the burden of establishing 
public use for the required period 
of time is upon those claiming it. 
The mere fact that members of 
the public may use a private 
driveway or alley without inter-
ference .will not necessarily 
establish it as a public way; nor 
will the fact that it was shown 
on the public records to be a 
public_street; nor even that it 
had been paved and sign-posted as 
a public street by the City ... 
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An extensive dissenting opinion was issued in this 
case by Justice Callister in which he reviewed a number 
of a cases pertaining to the dedication of a public 
right-of-way. 
It is the position of the appellants that the 
road in question has always been private property 
and has been posted as private. The appellants have 
never consented to public use of the road and have 
done everything in their power to observe the road 
as a private road. It is in the contention of the 
appellants that the respondents failed to carry their 
burden in demonstrating that the road was dedicated to 
the public by the property owners and accepted by the 
public as a public road. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of the appellants that the 
respondents failed to carry their burden in proving 
by clear and convincing evidence that the Cottonwood 
Road, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, 
was a public road or that the respondents had estab-
lished a right-of-way by prescription. The appellants 
contend that the road has always been private, contin-
ually posted as private and that the appellants used 
every means reasonably available to them to prohibit 
use of the road to all parties except those having 
permission from the property owners. 
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WHEREFORE, the appellants petition the Court 
to dismiss the respondents' claim and d~clare the 
road in fact a private road and that the respondents 
have no prescriptive easement over it. 
DATED this day of March, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Appellants 
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